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BULGARIA

Disputed Disarmament Issues Reviewed *AU0506135988 Sofia NARODNA ARMIYA in Bulgarian 1 Jun 88 p 4*

[Telephone dispatch by NARODNA ARMIYA special correspondent Major Vladi Vladkov: "The Key Issue"]

[Text] Moscow, 31 May—It may sound paradoxical, but the military experts of the two countries have an especially important role in relation to the complex disarmament issues that are predominant in the summit talks in Moscow. Military observer Colonel Vladimir Nazarenko gave me his view on this question:

Both Defense and Foreign Ministry representatives are taking part on an equal basis in the Soviet-American talks on disarmament issues. This dialogue would be impossible without the military, and a large number of military experts of all levels are involved in the talks. This is perfectly natural, since all the weapons are held by the military, no one knows their capabilities better than they do, and there is no one better able to say to what level the weapons can be reduced at a given moment without reducing the combat effectiveness of the armed forces or disturbing parity. For this reason military experts are also taking a most active part in the dialogue as members of the delegations both at the Geneva talks and here in Moscow. On the Soviet side, the military group is led by Marshal of the Soviet Union Sergey Akhromeyev. Colonel General Nikolay Chervov, chief of a directorate of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces, is also taking part, while at the Geneva talks the military delegation is led by Major General Yuriy Lebedev. Of course, they represent only a small part of the large number of military experts whose main task is to prepare decisions for the diplomats to defend at the various negotiations and meetings, Col Nazarenko noted in conclusion.

It has already become known that the difficult and intense work of the diplomats and military experts in preparing the text of the treaty for a 50-percent reduction of strategic offensive weapons cannot be completed at the present summit in Moscow. Despite the fact that at the Geneva talks joint Soviet-American drafts have been drawn up for four documents relating to the reduction of the Soviet and U.S. strategic offensive weapons—namely a draft document for the treaty itself, a memorandum on initial data, a protocol on inspections, and a protocol on conversion and elimination—and despite the fact that substantial progress has been achieved in certain specific directions, the preparation has nonetheless been held up and certain key questions are still under dispute.

The first issue at dispute is the obligation to continue to abide by the ABM Treaty for an agreed period. The Soviet side consistently stresses the need to retain the ABM Treaty in the form in which it was signed in 1972, and proposes that this be reflected in an agreement on

preserving the Washington accords of 10 December 1987. The U.S. delegation is attempting to revise these accords and to obtain the USSR's agreement to practically unlimited activity in the area of creating and amending the components and forms of the space ABM system during the period that the ABM Treaty is still being observed.

The second issue at dispute is the problem of the sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCM). The Soviet Union is for setting a limit for such missiles (both nuclear and nonnuclear versions), and proposes broad-scale measures for verification [kontrol].

The third key issue concerns the air-launched cruise missiles (ALCM), and relates to the rules for counting these missiles for the purposes of the strategic offensive weapons treaty. The Soviet side holds the view that for heavy bombers the count should cover the number of ALCM's that the heavy bombers have actually been modified to carry. The American side proposes that the ALCM's on the heavy bombers be counted on the basis of an arbitrarily chosen number, which for the United States would be less than the actual capabilities of their heavy bombers.

According to the American approach, a considerable portion of the U.S. heavy bombers equipped with ALCM's should fall outside the scope of the future treaty. These are bombers that can be converted to carry nuclear weapons. For this reason the Soviet side is proposing measures for all heavy bombers, irrespective of their armaments, to be regarded as strategic weapons carriers.

There are further questions at dispute concerning the precise definition of the warheads of the strategic offensive weapons and the mobile ICBM's. A number of questions also await settlement regarding verification and the exchange of information between the parties concerning their strategic offensive weapons. The Soviet position is that this exchange cover all categories of ICBM's, submarine-launched ballistic missiles, heavy bombers, ALCM's, and SLCM's.

For this reason serious work lies ahead for the USSR and the United States to make the strategic offensive weapons treaty a reality.

It is still too early to forecast the results of the talks on the problems of strategic weapons, but the view is already prevailing that Moscow will be an important stage in this process.

Summit Called 'Beginning of Nuclear Disarmament'

*AU0606095888 Sofia RABOTNICHESKO DELO in
Bulgarian 3 Jun 88 pp 1, 5*

[Editorial: "The Beginning"]

[Text] June 1 has become a historic date, because on that day the signatures of the leaders of the two great powers—the USSR and the United States—marked the

beginning of nuclear disarmament. For the first time in postwar history, weapons of mass destruction and apocalyptic destruction will be eliminated. For the first time technological lines for the production of intermediate- and shorter-range nuclear missiles will be eliminated from the production of weapons of mass destruction, which are growing according to a geometric progression. Regardless of how insignificant the percentage of these weapons in the total arsenal of the carriers of nuclear death is, the elimination of their great destructive force and the fact that mankind, which is on the brink of the precipice, is taking the first step backwards, affords a reason for the satisfaction and happiness with which the peoples of the five continents are greeting the exchange of the ratification documents of the INF Treaty.

On 15 January 1986, Moscow heralded its antinuclear manifesto to the world. This manifesto called upon us to enter the 21st century free of the lethal burden of means of mass destruction. Some 2 1/2 years later, again in Moscow, the first universal victory in the name of sense and life was marked. Even if the fourth USSR-U.S. summit had been connected only with this act, it would nevertheless have justified the expectations and hopes of the peoples.

However, the new dialogue between Mikhail Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, and U.S. President Ronald Reagan, also excited the whole of mankind with the prospects of concluding an even more comprehensive agreement on reducing the most horrible weapons of mass destruction—the strategic strike weapons—by 50 percent. The Joint Statement on the results of the meeting inspires the hope that a significant part of the road to this second treaty on nuclear disarmament has been travelled in Moscow. Progress has been marked in many areas and the draft of this document already encompasses more than 300 pages. The progress of the talks showed that there is a chance that the document will be signed as soon as during the term of office of the 40th U.S. President, in other words, by January 1989. However, as the two leaders stressed, the issue in question is not how quickly to sign this document which is so important for the survival of mankind. The important issue is to prepare a really good treaty, which will not only preserve the military-strategic parity between the two great powers on a level of nuclear confrontation which is lower by 50 percent, but also, and this is the most important factor, to turn the treaty into the legal and technical basis of the following stages of mankind's progress toward total nuclear disarmament.

Moscow also strengthened the chances of peace because it confirmed the guiding premises which led USSR-U.S. relations from the era of confrontation to the tracks of cooperation, and asserted the USSR-U.S. dialogue as one of the most important factors of world peace and cooperation. These guiding premises are today the greatest guarantee of the world's survival. In the great Kremlin Palace, as well as on the shores of Lake Geneva these premises were articulated as the political creed of the

first USSR and U.S. leaders. The Joint Statement, which was adopted, recalls: "They, (the two leaders), reaffirmed their solemn conviction that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought, their determination to prevent any war between the Soviet Union and the United States, whether nuclear or conventional, and their disavowal of any intention to achieve military superiority." The adherence to these peace-making premises inspires us with an ever greater conviction that after the Moscow stage of the dialogue between Gorbachev and Reagan the antiwar program will intensify the activity of the two great powers and their partners throughout the world.

The Bulgarian people, who followed the progress of the Moscow summit with unflagging attention, warmly greet its remarkable results. They warmly greet the beginning of nuclear disarmament, marked by Mikhail Gorbachev and Ronald Reagan, and wish that the advance toward a world free of weapons, wars, and oppression becomes a lasting and irreversible process. Thus it will lead us toward the age of universal cooperation and agreement.

Zhivkov Message Sent to UN Disarmament Session

AU0706071888 Sofia RABOTNICHESKO DELO in Bulgarian 3 Jun 88 pp 1,6

[Greeting message from Todor Zhivkov, chairman of the State Council, to the Third UN General Assembly Special Session on Disarmament, "submitted" to the session in New York on 2 June 1988]

[Text] The third UN General Assembly special session on disarmament coincides with a turning point in international life. The world is now witnessing an active, constructive dialogue between the Soviet Union and the United States. The first serious steps toward the consolidation of international security have been accomplished: The INF Treaty and the Geneva agreements on the settlement of the situation around Afghanistan are part of these measures. The results of the Moscow talks between Mikhail Gorbachev and Ronald Reagan once more confirmed that in world politics even the greatest obstacles and prejudices can be overcome by common sense and goodwill. The new political thinking is making headway in interstate relations. The concern about universal human values is increasingly prevailing upon narrow class and national interests.

Millions of people throughout the world who have rallied in various social movements directed against the nuclear threat are also sharing a feeling of gratification and a justified awareness of having contributed to these successes.

Mankind is entitled to enjoy a moment of respite, but not to give up the struggle. War and militarism—as an abstract philosophy and as realities—continue to coexist on our planet along with the peoples' struggle for peace and peaceful coexistence. Forums, such as the third UN

General Assembly session on disarmament, determine to the greatest extent whether or not positive trends will prevail and become a lasting, irreversible process.

The Bulgarian public expects the third special session to discuss topical problems in international life in a positive and constructive spirit and to map out the basic goals of the further development and intensification of the disarmament process, the conditions, paths, and methods of achieving them on earth and in space. It is required particularly that the session pronounce itself in favor of the practical meaning of the concept of a mutual link between disarmament and development.

I take advantage of the opportunity to assure you that the People's Republic of Bulgaria is ready to pursue its efforts in connection with transforming the Balkans into a zone free of mass destruction weapons, actively to contribute to and participate in the total, multidimensional process of halting the arms race.

I wish the participants in the third UN General Assembly special session on disarmament fruitful work in making the disarmament process intensive and irreversible.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Chnoupek Meets GDR, Finland Figures
LD0206233088 Prague CTK in English
2027 GMT 2 Jun 88

[Text] New York June 2 (CTK correspondent)—Czechoslovak Foreign Minister Bohuslav Chnoupek met here today with Finnish Premier Harri Holkeri.

They reviewed the possibilities of bilateral relations and discussed the international situation, especially in connection with the third special UN General Assembly session on disarmament.

Bohuslav Chnoupek informed the Finnish representative of the Czechoslovak proposal on the creation of a zone of confidence, cooperation and good neighbourly relations on the line dividing the Warsaw Treaty and NATO states and on world response to this initiative.

The Czechoslovak foreign minister met also with his GDR counterpart Oskar Fischer to discuss further development of bilateral relations and exchange opinions on international topics.

Bohuslav Chnoupek met on the same day with Peruvian Foreign Minister Luis Gonzalez Posada.

Summit Termed 'Important Stage' in Dialogue
AU0606185388 Prague RUDE PRAVO in Czech
3 Jun 88 p 1

[Editorial: "The Value of Dialogue"]

[Text] There is no doubt that the Moscow meeting between Mikhail Gorbachev and Ronald Reagan, the CPSU Central Committee general secretary and the U.S. President, already the fourth one, concluded one important stage of the Soviet-American political dialogue which started in Geneva in 1985. It is a stage marked by the Treaty on the Elimination of Soviet and American Intermediate- and Shorter-Range Missiles, which went in effect on 1 June. Children in the whole world, who had a holiday that day, could not receive a better present. And not only children—the whole of mankind, too.

Let us believe that the "stage of treaty No 2," of the treaty on the 50-percent reduction of strategic weapons, will overcome all opposition, and that the current or future U.S. President, together with the CPSU Central Committee general secretary, will sooner or later sign it.

Thus, after a number of "frosty" years the Soviet-American dialogue has entered a very active phase, with a new, higher level. The dialogue searches for and formulates principles on which not only Soviet-American relations, but also international relations in general could be based. The manifestation of that effort lies in the joint statement now adopted by the Soviet Union and the United States in Moscow. In its own way, it is a glance into the near and distant future, an attempt to lay foundation stones for a world without nuclear weapons and without wars.

The Moscow meeting—if we are to justly assess its significance—must be seen as a part of an almost two and half year process from the summit meeting in Geneva up to today. No new, major disarmament or other agreement was really signed at this fourth Gorbachev-Reagan meeting; nevertheless, it was, after all, a great international event which strengthened the Soviet-American dialogue. And it is a difficult dialogue, that is obvious, but it is absolutely necessary for the whole of international relations, and let us be fair and say that it is an uninterrupted and intensive dialogue.

The Soviet-American talks are not by far—as it might seem from looking at the television screen—a parade of smiles. They do not leave the ground of reality, they are, quite naturally, accompanied by the two sides' disputes about the urgent problems of the present. But they realistically result in a common understanding that the talks must be given a broader framework, that it is necessary to begin clarifying general issues.

It has showed that in some issues on the agenda—especially in the key issue, in disarmament—it has thus far been impossible to agree for one reason: There are often profoundly differing views on the essence of the

problem arising from the ballast of the past, among other things, from the surviving stereotypes of the cold war. From this, too, stems the dispute about what the solutions should be like.

Nevertheless, the dialogue has acquired a programmatic character. Its continuation requires the determining of certain common principles, common objectives, with which both sides agree and which they want to and consider it imperative to implement. The first principle has already been approved and it has become the axis around which the talks turn: Nuclear war is unacceptable and must not happen.

Thus the current U.S. Government has acceded to the Soviet standpoint that nuclear war has an exterminatory role, that it cannot be a means to achieving any political objective, that unleashing it would be a catastrophe for mankind.

The demand for nuclear disarmament is the logical result of that principle. The United States has covered a considerable section of the road but, for the time being, it does not want to go all the way. American politicians suffer from the illusion that nuclear weapons "defend peace"; that they are a deterrent, and therefore are necessary for U.S. security. Equally, they assert that space weapons, which they are intensively developing, are to protect against nuclear weapons. Thus, the question, to which the American side must find an answer, is: When it excludes the possibility of nuclear war, for what purpose, then, does it need nuclear weapons? What purpose are the space weapons to serve?

The principle of the equilibrium of interests is a principle of exceptional importance. The United States agrees with it but, at the same time, it often violates it. Here is the answer to the question why, even though progress is obvious, more was not achieved at the Moscow meeting. The American side stubbornly continues its effort to gain unilateral advantages. This shows, above all, during the talks on reducing the arsenals of strategic weapons to a half. This applies, for example, to sea-launched cruise missiles, but also to an important issue such as SDI—an American program which is paving the way for an arms buildup in space.

History provides the emphatic lesson that attempts to gain unilateral military advantages and, on this basis, also political advantages, set the wheels of the arms buildup spinning and inevitably lead to a confrontation. Therefore, it is so important that general issues be clarified in Soviet-American relations, that precisely here, where the process of political decisionmaking begins, the necessary agreement be reached.

Despite all the critical assessments, Soviet-American relations have changed, and we can say that there has been a revolutionary change in them. One feels detente in the world, and this helps to improve relations between states and nations, helps to restore trust and understanding.

The process of nuclear disarmament has begun. Influential forces and instruments have begun moving, which create the possibility of resolving a number of regional conflicts. The development of bilateral U.S.-USSR relations is undergoing a hopeful and, compared with the past, unprecedented upsurge.

Nevertheless, the following question is justified: Is it a lasting change, where are the guarantees that a reverse will not occur?

In 8 months there will be a new president in the White House, a new government will come, new personalities. The Soviet leadership does not limit Soviet-American relations to this or that government, however. What is involved are relations of lasting interest. Precisely for this reason, in the Soviet view, one must not waste even those next 8 months; precisely for this reason the USSR proposes to the Reagan government to walk together as much of the way as possible, to do everything possible so that the development of mutual relations becomes irreversible.

The continuation and broadening of the Soviet-American dialogue pushes the element of military confrontation out of world politics, replaces tension by detente, insecurity by security, mistrust by trust, arguments are becoming the main weapon. The new political thinking in a nuclear age, which the Soviet Union submitted to the world precisely by means of dialogue, demonstrates its viability.

GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

Summit, Superpower Dialogue Evaluated

LD0306104188 East Berlin Voice of GDR Domestic Service in German 1605 GMT 2 Jun 88

[Commentary by Klaus-Juergen Fischer]

[Text] Good evening from Moscow, dear listeners. The fourth Soviet-U.S. summit meeting within 2 and 1/2 years now lies behind us. This was a necessary and full continuation of the dialogue between the two superpowers. If, as a correspondent for many years here in the Soviet Union, I think back with very mixed feelings to the years of noncommunication between Moscow and Washington in connection with the deployment of U.S. intermediate-range missiles in Western Europe, the fact that the leading representatives of the USSR and the United States are now meeting so frequently is on its own enough to make me happy.

The difficult path from Geneva, via Reykjavik and Washington, to Moscow, which I have been able to follow very closely on the spot, has borne fruit. Here, a historic network of treaties has been implemented which introduces nuclear disarmament. 2,600 missiles are going to be scrapped. Hundreds of missile transporters are being converted into cranes and pipeline carriers. In the Votkinsk works for the manufacture of the SS-20

missiles, production is being converted to the manufacture of peaceful products. Thus, the Moscow summit has a turning-point in arms control politics, because for the first time, a treaty was raised to the status of international law that not only limits weapons, but eliminates them.

In a few weeks, we have learned from responsible experts in the Defense Ministry here, in Kazakhstan and Siberia, detonations will be making the air tremble; these are of a peaceful nature, and they announce disarmament. Pioneer troops will be blowing up missiles. I parallel with this, the process will be carried out on the U.S. side. And, after the ahead-of-schedule withdrawal already carried out of missiles of the relevant categories from the GDR, we are immediately included in the realization of the document.

Until 1 June 2001, our territory is open to U.S. inspectors for monitoring, a concrete contribution by our country, without which the treaty would not have been able to come about. In saying disarmament, listeners, what we mean by that word is disarmament, and when we say monitoring, that is also what we mean. This independent contribution by our Republic, the flexibility, when the possibility was on offer of making a double-zero variant for missiles out of the zero solution has been prized very highly here, and not only here. We intend to go further.

After the Moscow summit, there exists the justified hope, the statement by Erich Honecker says on this point, that missiles of less than 500 km range will be included in the disarmament process. In Moscow, however, encouraging preconditions have also been created, according to the highest representative of our state in his statement, for a 50 percent reduction of strategic offensive weapons of the two states to be achieved. Certain stumbling blocks have been cleared out of the way.

In front of me on the desk here in the electronic press center in Moscow-Ostankino are two press documents. On the left, from the Soviet side; on the right, from the Americans. On these documents the situation at the Geneva negotiations is set out before the Moscow summit: Where there is agreement; where there are points of contact; where the problems lie. The two sides today had to issue new documents, because some problems have been solved, even if there has not yet been a breakthrough. The main progress lies in the nexus between the sought-after halving of nuclear armaments on the earth and adherence to the ABM Treaty, which of course bans armament in space. New Soviet proposals concerning this were not at first replied to.

I spoke about this with a military expert of the first rank, Colonel General Vladimir Lobov, first deputy of the chief of General Staff, while his immediate superior, Marshal Akhromyev, was chairing a working group during the summit. During the interview with GDR radio, the military man said that one of the most

important reasons why the negotiations on halving the strategic weapons arsenals were not proceeding at the same speed as they ought to is the lack of trust. And here, one could recognize the connection between these negotiations and the independent initiatives that have been put forth by the GDR and other socialist countries. The value of these initiatives consists in the fact, the Soviet military man told us, that their realization would not merely lead to the reduction of military confrontation in Europe, but also to the strengthening of trust between East and West. In this way, these proposals support the process of disarmament.

According to Colonel General Lobov, we accord great importance to the joint proposal of the GDR and the CSSR concerning the creation of a nuclear weapons-free corridor in central Europe. This is why we welcome and support the meeting convened in Berlin about nuclear weapons-free zones. I believe that it is good to know that, here in the Soviet Union, the Berlin forum is regarded with such esteem and with support of an authoritative nature, a forum which for the first time will bring together state, parliamentary, and social representatives to an extent hitherto unknown, and which will give the disarmament process new impetus. Good night and good-bye from Moscow.

Honecker Greets Physicians Peace Congress
*AU0606070788 East Berlin NEUES DEUTSCHLAND
in German 2 Jun 88 p 4*

[ND report: "The GDR Always Supports Every Step
Toward a Nuclear-Free World"]

[Text] East Berlin—Erich Honecker, general secretary of the SED Central Committee and chairman of the GDR State Council, has sent the following greetings message to the Eighth World Congress of the International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War (IPPNW), which starts today, Thursday, in the Canadian city of Montreal:

On behalf of the State Council, the Government, and all citizens of the GDR, I convey to the participants and guests of the Eighth IPPNW World Congress cordial greetings and wish your discussions much success.

People on all continents see in the agreement on the elimination of U.S. and Soviet intermediate-range missiles in Europe the lead-in to nuclear disarmament and expect new initiatives on the path toward a peaceful world.

This year's worldwide IPPNW campaign "Cease-Fire '88—Stop Nuclear Testing" and the numerous other contributions which the IPPNW physicians are making—following the humanist ethics of their profession and as competent advocates of the people in their care—

for the mobilization of the forces of reason and goodwill are important actions which one cannot fail to hear and which give expression to the demand for the abolition of all nuclear weapons.

In line with its policy directed toward peace and security, the GDR will always support every step toward a nuclear-free world. This aim is also served by the "International Meeting for Nuclear-Free Zones," which has been called for June 1988 in the capital city of Berlin.

Rest assured that in the future, too, we will continue to actively support the work of the IPPNW.

E. Honecker

Ernst Addresses Vienna Talks

AU0506193788 East Berlin NEUES DEUTSCHLAND
in German 2 Jun 88 p 4

[Text] Vienna (ADN)—The entering into force of the Soviet-U.S. Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate- and Shorter-Range Missiles marks the start of nuclear disarmament, ambassador Klaus-Dieter Ernst, head of the GDR delegation, pointed out during the talks on the mutual reduction of armed forces and armaments in central Europe in Vienna on Wednesday [1 June]. The GDR has created all required conditions so that inspections can be conducted on its territory in accordance with the treaty. The agreement that has now entered into force demonstrates how difficult questions that are important for security can be resolved in a reasonable manner, if each side takes the legitimate interests of the other into account. Such an attitude is also necessary to bring about an agreement at the Vienna talks, the significance of which must not be underestimated in the process of detente.

The GDR is in favor of reducing the high concentration of military forces in central Europe, Ambassador Ernst stressed. Military stability and security would increase for the countries concerned and for Europe if the most dangerous weapons were reduced and ultimately removed at the dividing line between the two military coalitions. For this reason the GDR advocates the creation of zones that should be free from certain types of weapons, and has extended invitations to participate in the Berlin International Meeting on Nuclear-Free Zones. The positive changes in the international situation following the conclusion of the Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate- and Shorter-Range Missiles should be used to make progress in reducing armed forces and weapons in Europe, Ambassador Ernst stated.

Results of Moscow Summit Assessed

AU0606170388 East Berlin NEUES DEUTSCHLAND
in German 3 Jun 88 p 2

[Werner Micke commentary from Moscow: "Political Dialogue and Results of the Summit"]

[Text] The Moscow summit between Mikhail Gorbachev and Ronald Reagan has become history. Speeches and documents have been published, and balance sheets are

drawn everywhere as to what results have been obtained at this fourth summit after the Geneva, Reykjavik, and Washington meetings.

Without any doubt, the most important event was the implementation of the Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate- and Shorter-Range Missiles. The Moscow summit represents a fresh start for nuclear disarmament, and the preparations for the meeting contributed to clearing the last remaining obstacles that still obstructed the real start of nuclear disarmament. Strictly speaking, this process had already begun before the exchange of the ratification documents, and the conversion of the Waren missile base into a recreation facility for trade unions will be as much remembered by the people as a symbol of socialism's active peace efforts as the conversion of mobile missile ramps into construction cranes.

All those who are committed to safeguarding peace have welcomed with satisfaction the idea that a joint draft for the text of an agreement on the reduction and limitation of strategic offensive weapons now exists. In the joint summit statement everybody can read what key issues have already been fixed. The conviction, expressed there by the highest representatives of the two superpowers, that the work that has been done provides the basis for the conclusion of this contract, creates a positive climate for another large step toward nuclear disarmament, which will make a sizable contribution to strengthening strategic stability on the globe. As far as other important areas of disarmament are concerned, certain progress is discernible. This has not least been demonstrated by the signing of two agreements in Moscow.

During the farewell ceremony for the U.S. President, Mikhail Gorbachev stated that, following the Geneva meeting, Soviet-U.S. relations have been guided toward a less dangerous direction. This is evident from the agreements reached and the new targets of cooperation, including important issues that concern the whole of mankind, such as a change in the climate of international relations.

However—and this was pointed out by both sides—not all outstanding urgent questions concerning conventional and nuclear disarmament were resolved. It was not possible to overcome all differences in opinion and all contradictory views. This was also demonstrated by the fact that Reagan's advisors did not agree on results on these issues.

One cannot speak about the Moscow summit without mentioning the great significance of political dialogue which—in spite of and even because of all the contradictions, obstacles, and difficulties—increasingly proves to be an adequate method of solving complicated problems. It must be continued by all those who want to make peace more secure and improve the coexistence among peoples on our earth. In this spirit, Erich Honecker's statement in which he expressed the GDR's approval of the summit results was registered with satisfaction in

Moscow. "Let us not waste any time in continuing to proceed on the path that was embarked on in Moscow! The peoples expect it!" Erich Honecker stressed.

USSR's Zagladin Briefs Honecker on Summit
*LD0606192888 East Berlin ADN International Service
in German 1749 GMT 6 Jun 88*

[Text] On behalf of CPSU General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev, Vadim Zagladin on Monday informed Erich Honecker, general secretary of the SED Central Committee and chairman of the GDR Council of State, on the course and results of the Soviet-U.S. summit meeting in Moscow. Central Committee member Zagladin, first deputy director of the CPSU Central Committee's International Department, conveyed the Soviet leadership's satisfaction concerning Erich Honecker's 1 June statement.

The results of the summit meeting have the GDR's full support, Erich Honecker said. It had contributed to further detente in East-West relations, as well as to the advancement of disarmament negotiations and to making peace more secure.

According to the view agreed upon by the partners in the talks, the Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate- and Shorter-Range Missiles, which has now come into force, is the result of a policy that takes into account the realities of the nuclear-space age, of the Warsaw Pact's dynamic peace policy, and of the struggle of all peaceful forces against a nuclear inferno. Vadim Zagladin stressed the GDR's constructive contribution to the existence of the treaty.

Erich Honecker greeted the progress achieved during the summit in the direction of a 50-percent reduction in the strategic offensive weapons of both states and of a restriction on nuclear weapons tests. He expressed the GDR's expectation that the relevant negotiations would soon lead to agreements.

Both sides agreed that the Moscow summit meeting was convincing proof of the usefulness of political dialogue. Erich Honecker stressed that multilateral impulses concerning this would emanate from the GDR in the future. An essential contribution to dialogue between the most diverse forces from throughout the world in the interest of dismantling confrontation and mistrust and of seeking effective solutions to the most burning present problem may be expected from the forthcoming Berlin International Meeting on Nuclear Weapons-Free Zones. According to Vadim Zagladin, the USSR will contribute actively to the Berlin meeting with a representative delegation.

The partners in the talks affirmed the resolution of their parties, states, and peoples to further deepening their friendship and cooperation, as a pledge to past and future successes in the international arena and to socialist construction in their countries.

HUNGARY

Varkonyi Attends UN Session

Meets FRG's Genscher
*LD0706225988 Budapest MTI in English
1952 GMT 7 Jun 88*

[Text] New York, June 7 (MTI)—At the extraordinary disarmament session of the UN General Assembly the head of the Hungarian delegation, Minister of Foreign Affairs Peter Varkonyi had a meeting with Hans-Dietrich Genscher, minister of foreign affairs of the FRG.

At the meeting contemporary issues of the international situation and bilateral relations were reviewed. Special attention was paid to the follow-up meeting in Vienna and it was agreed that the strengthening of the European security and cooperation process would be achieved by speedy conclusion of the work of the conference. In this interest both countries are to step up efforts. The two ministers of foreign affairs discussed the situation of the negotiations on the cooperation agreement to be signed between Hungary and the EEC.

Meets Qian Qichen, Tindemans
*LD0806091188 Budapest MTI in English
0708 GMT 8 Jun 88*

[Text] New York, June 7 (MTI)—Hungarian Foreign Minister Peter Varkonyi, currently attending the special session of the U.N. General Assembly met in New York Qian Qichen, Chinese minister of foreign affairs. In addition to timely international issues, they paid particular attention to the situation of Hungarian-Chinese relations, and stated that there are numerous opportunities for the expansion of cooperation in the economic and commercial fields. The discussions covered the strengthening of the role of the United Nations organization which is especially topical amid the present international conditions.

Peter Varkonyi also held talks with Belgian Foreign Minister Leo Tindemans on timely international questions, the importance of the Soviet-American summit meeting in Moscow and the issue of the EEC-Hungary trade agreement.

POLAND

'Text' of Jaruzelski Message to UN Session
*LD0606205888 Warsaw PAP in English
1954 GMT 6 Jun 88*

[Text] New York, June 6—President of Poland's Council of State Wojciech Jaruzelski sent a message to the third special session of the General Assembly of the United Nations devoted to disarmament. Text:

The Polish people welcome the convening of the third special session of the General Assembly of the United Nations devoted to disarmament with satisfaction and hope. The time of an unbridled escalation of the arms race, especially in the nuclear field, has brought mankind dangerously close to the point of no return. Crossing that point would be tantamount to annihilating our civilization. The economic consequences of the arms race have left their ominous mark on world economy, aggravating disparities between states and leading to dangerous tension in different parts of the world.

The last few months, however, have eloquently demonstrated that what for decades was being considered sheer utopia is in fact perfectly possible. The Soviet-American Treaty on the Elimination of the Intermediate and Shorter-Range Missiles has restored to the word "disarmament" its proper meaning. It has turned out that a physical elimination of the means of mass destruction is fully practicable. This should be transferred on to other fields of disarmament as well.

An event of great importance was the last meeting, in Moscow, between Mikhail Gorbachev and Ronald Reagan. It demonstrated that the great powers were intensifying their dialogue. The improved quality of their mutual relations that is gradually taking shape, is in the interest of the whole international community. The agreements reached pave the way towards new disarmament accords. In particular, they bring closer the conclusion of a treaty on the fifty-percent reduction and limitation of Soviet and American strategic offensive weapons.

The present special session of the General Assembly of the United Nations stands a historic chance of adding momentum to the disarmament process. That chance must not be lost. The vast potential of intellect and political will of those participating in this world forum, their accumulated historical experience and a favourable political climate at present should yield the fruit of a creative development of the concept of common security through disarmament and enhanced mutual confidence as well as the mapping out of the ways and means of putting that concept into effect. Poland's historic experiences account for its keen interest in the conduct of disarmament negotiations. We have put forth a number of proposals and ideas over the past years. Among them, the concept of atom-free [as received] zones, for example, has become a concrete reality in many parts of the world.

Over a year ago, on 8 May 1987, from the rostrum of the II Congress of the Patriotic Movement for National Rebirth, I had the honour to submit a plan on decreasing armaments and increasing confidence in central Europe. The essence of the initiative was elaborated in detail in a memorandum of the Polish Government of 17 July 1987 and subsequently was presented at the forty-second session of the General Assembly of the United Nations.

The Polish initiative has been the subject of talks and consultations both with its direct addressees and with all other interested states.

The underlying objective of the Polish proposal is to lay down the foundations of a system of common European security, to eliminate the destabilizing impact of the present level of military confrontation in Europe upon the overall international situation. The crux of the plan is to transform military potentials into strictly defensive ones through a set of comprehensive measures of political, military, doctrinal and technical character. We propose that appropriate undertakings cover the nuclear and conventional armaments, the character of military doctrines and confidence-building measures.

We regard as most pressing the scaling down of the possibility of a surprise attack by any party, a goal that can be attained through a substantive reduction of the offensive components of the military potentials while retaining forces sufficient to ensure effective defense against any attack.

While developing and concretizing our initiative we were bearing in mind both the postulates articulated by our partners as well as the requirements and possibilities offered at the present stage of the disarmament dialogue.

Recognizing the tactical nuclear weapons deployed in Europe to constitute a singularly dangerous element of the potential that could be used also for a surprise attack, we come out for its gradual reduction and subsequent elimination. As a preliminary step we propose to undertake a commitment not to increase the level of nuclear armaments in central Europe and to refrain from compensating for the armaments reduced as well as not to deploy new types of such arms.

Appropriate undertakings in that regard, while closely linked to all-European conventional disarmament, could be considered independently, at a separate negotiating forum.

Seeking to ensure military stability in the field of conventional armed forces and armaments at a proportionately lower level, we advocate first of all the elimination of the existing disproportions and asymmetries in armed forces and individual kinds of weapons. To this end, we envisage i.a. a possibility of "packet" deals, allowing for the sides to reduce different—but equivalent—components of the military potentials.

In our considered view, the disarmament undertakings in central Europe should lead to the creation of a zone of thinned-out armaments enjoying a special regime that would cover the numerical strength, armaments, disposition and readiness of the armed forces. In such a zone, the most threatening components of armaments would be moved farther away from the line of contact and put into a state of lower readiness or eliminated from the

armed forces altogether. Such a zone of thinned-out armaments would reduce or pre-empt the possibility of launching a surprise attack, particularly an attack on a large scale.

Postulating the evolution of military doctrines so that they could be based on the principle of defensive sufficiency we suggest to take into due account both political as well as military and technical aspects of such doctrines. An expanded version of the plan embodies also an inventory of confidence-building measures for central Europe, embracing i.a. the exchange of military information, limitation of the activities of armed forces depending on the place of their stationing, the establishment of a "hot line" communications system between the supreme authorities and military high commands.

All the undertakings proposed by us would be subject to strict verification, including mandatory inspections, exchange of military information and appropriate supervision. Subject to control would be also the observance of levels obtained as a result of the implementation of agreed measures.

We are also proposing such a manner of implementation of the measures envisaged in the plan which would not be to the detriment of the security interest of any state.

The Polish proposal retains its open character. We stand ready to co-operate with all interested governments on the development of the proposals incorporated in the plan.

The elimination of threats to the security of Europe, a continent where both world wars originated, would constitute a concrete contribution to enhancing confidence and co-operation between nations and to the consolidation of peace and security world-wide.

I am confident that the representatives participating in this session will muster sufficient courage, wisdom and sense of responsibility to attain the goals set forth before them by the international community. I have the honour to convey to the session my best wishes for every success in the discharge of its lofty mission. [end of message]

A statement by Poland's foreign and defence ministries containing more details of the Polish proposal is expected to be published shortly.

Orzechowski Attends UN Session

Meets Genscher, Tindemans

*LD0806022188 Warsaw PAP in English
0032 GMT 8 Jun 88*

[Text] New York, June 7—Polish Foreign Minister Marian Orzechowski met Monday with FRG Vice-Chancellor and Minister for Foreign Affairs Hans-Dietrich Genscher.

The talk focused on some aspects of bilateral relations. The two also discussed the issues and to-date course of the U.N. 3rd special session on disarmament.

Marian Orzechowski also met with Belgian Foreign Minister Leo Tindemans.

Meets Qian Qichen, Nepalese

*LD0806061088 Warsaw PAP in English
0945 GMT 8 Jun 88*

[Text] New York, June 8—Polish Foreign Minister Marian Orzechowski, now in New York for the 3rd UN special General Assembly session on disarmament, met here yesterday with Foreign Minister of the People's Republic of China Qian Qichen.

Reviewing the state and prospects of bilateral relations, the sides stressed the importance of Polish Premier Zbigniew Messner's current official visit to People's China for the intensification of economic cooperation between the two countries.

During the talks the two also discussed some of the aspects of the international situation, debated during the current UN disarmament session.

Orzechowski also met with his counterpart from the Kingdom of Nepal Shailendra Kumar Upadhyaya.

ROMANIA

Gorbachev-Reagan Summit in Moscow Reported

*AU0706144488 Bucharest LUMEA No 23, in
Romanian 2 Jun 88 pp 7, 8*

[Vasile Crisu article: "Soviet-American Summit Talks"]

[Text] A new Soviet-American summit meeting began at the Kremlin on the afternoon of 29 May. Mikhail Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, and U.S. President Ronald Reagan are sitting at the negotiating table for the fourth time. The current dialogue also marks the first visit of a head of the U.S. Administration to the USSR for 14 years. The preceding talks took place in Geneva (1985), Reykjavik (1986), and Washington (1987).

The agenda of the Moscow meeting includes, as the subject of the exchange of views, numerous current international issues and, naturally, questions of bilateral relations. Within this framework, the talks on main aspects of disarmament, primarily nuclear disarmament, are followed with particular interest by public opinion and all peoples, by taking into consideration the particular responsibilities these two states with such considerable weight are called upon to assume in practice in this respect. Especially new impulses are expected in order to move to achieving, in the shortest possible time, an agreement between the USSR and the United States on the elimination of intermediate-range nuclear missiles

and to speed up the conclusion, as soon as possible, of an agreement between the two great nuclear powers on cutting strategic nuclear weapons by half—tangible measures that, undoubtedly, will pave the way for the total elimination of nuclear weapons. The stress placed before the Moscow summit meeting by prominent political figures in both Europe and other parts of the world and by front-ranking representatives of progressive forces and of mass and civic organizations on the major aspects of the agenda of the two leaders stems from the feeling that, after the signing—in Washington last December—of the Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate- and Shorter-Range Missiles (INF), things “slowed down.” Thus the INF agreement was ratified in extremis only 48 hours before the beginning of the Kremlin talks. It was hailed everywhere as a historic event and as a first step on the actual road to nuclear disarmament, a modest step when considering the percentage of weapons that are to be eliminated compared with that of weapons still preserved in nuclear arsenals (some 3 percent of the total), but which set the basis for future actions that hopefully will be infinitely more vigorous. At the same time, at the Washington meeting it was decided that the next step should be an accord on a 50 percent cut in strategic nuclear weapons by the USSR and the United States, and the hope was expressed that it would be concluded during the visit of the U.S. President to Moscow. This hope gradually diminished in subsequent months. The frequent meetings of the foreign ministers of the two countries each time marked progress in this respect, but finally it was announced that this accord cannot be concluded for the fourth Soviet-American summit meeting. The slow pace of negotiations on this accord naturally has many causes. The first one being the complexity of issues under discussion, especially those linked with verification. However, as observers specify, time is pressing. Despite certain favorable tendencies, the international situation continues to be serious. There are no signs that the arms race is lessening but, on the contrary, the sources of armed conflict still exist and many of the contradictions of the present-day world are intensifying. The threats for peace continue to be great and it is obvious that one cannot speak of peace, security, and safety for the future if nuclear weapons are not stopped and eliminated and if no determined action is being taken to cut conventional arms and to eliminate, in the final analysis, any types of weapons.

When this edition was finished, only the first rounds of talks between Mikhail Gorbachev and Ronald Reagan had been held. According to the statements made by the spokesmen of the two sides, these talks had taken place in a constructive working atmosphere and were assessed as a “good beginning.” Worth mentioning is the fact that the talks focused on disarmament issues, although other aspects were also discussed. The two sides examined particularly the obstacles that must be eliminated on the road to preparing the treaty on a 50 percent cut in strategic offensive weapons, Gennadiy Gerasimov, chief of Information Administration of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, declared after the second round of talks.

He also pointed out that the Soviet side expressed the wish to prepare and to sign this treaty with the current Administration. I had the impression, he said, that the current Administration has received this desire positively.

As a matter of fact, at the dinner given Monday evening in honor of the U.S. President, Mikhail Gorbachev stressed the importance of the common conclusion of historic importance that had been reached during the Soviet-American summit dialogue, despite all differences, namely that in a nuclear war there cannot be any victors, and therefore it should not be unleashed. Our main concern, the general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee said, continues to be the formulation of the treaty on a 50 percent cut in strategic offensive weapons, while respecting the ABM Treaty. Stressing, in turn, that the first step had been taken in the direction of reducing the nuclear arsenals of the two states, President Ronald Reagan pointed to the intention of the United States to act, together with the USSR, to arrive at a new treaty in the period left of his presidential mandate, and expressed the hope that these efforts will be crowned by success.

The summit talks in Moscow are coupled by a number of contacts between officials accompanying the chief of the U.S. Administration and Soviet officials. Thus, Eduard Shevardnadze, USSR minister of foreign affairs, met with U.S. Foreign Secretary George Shultz. Likewise, a meeting was held between Army General Dmitriy Yazov, minister of defense of the USSR, and Frank Carlucci, U.S. defense secretary. Groups of experts were also set up to additionally examine the issues on the agenda of the summit talks.

The date when our magazine is published will coincide with the day of the end of the fourth Soviet-American summit meeting. What is expected up to then is the exchange of the ratification instruments of the Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate- and Shorter-Range Missiles and the signing of some understandings of a bilateral nature. It is expected that the dialogue will conclude by issuing a document on its results.

Totu Presents Stance on Disarmament
AU0406172388 Bucharest SCINTEIA in Romanian
5 June 88 p 6

[“Considerations and Proposals of Romania, and its President, Nicolae Ceausescu, on Disarmament Issues and the Countries’ Course of Action for Their Settlement—presented by Minister of Foreign Affairs Ioan Totu to the UN General Assembly third special session on disarmament,” on 4 June in New York]

[Text] On behalf of Nicolae Ceausescu, president of the SR of Romania, I take particular pleasure in conveying to you, the participants in the third special UN General Assembly session on disarmament, cordial greetings and wishes for complete success in implementing the vital

requirements of mankind—establishing a world without weapons and wars and ensuring the supreme right of all nations and peoples to existence, freedom, independence, life, and peace.

Romania and its president devote particular attention and attach great importance to the proceedings and the goals of the third special session of the UN General Assembly. The Romanian people's profound involvement in the cause of disarmament and peace derives from their general policy to ensure development and live peacefully together with all the nations of the world. It also derives from the belief that the socioeconomic progress of each country is closely connected with ensuring peace, security, and cooperation throughout the world.

I am greatly honored to present the considerations and proposals of Romania and of President Nicolae Ceaușescu on disarmament issues and the countries' directions of action for the settlement of these issues.

We are currently celebrating the 10th anniversary of the first special UN General Assembly session on disarmament. Unfortunately, this anniversary is not an opportunity for us to show a positive balance sheet. On the contrary. In the past 10 years, the arms race reached a galloping pace, and expenditures exceed \$1 trillion today, something that has unfavorable effects on all countries. Nuclear arsenals include stocks capable of destroying life on our planet several times over. As a natural consequence of this dramatic reality, the world economic crisis has increased, and the gaps between rich and poor countries have widened. Likewise, new sources of tension have been added to the tension and conflicts that existed 10 years ago. Some positive events that have taken place during this time are not capable of radically influencing the international political climate. Serious and complex problems continue to persist in the world, and they require a new approach and new ways of solving the problems in peace and war, in order to achieve a radical change in the international situation.

In our country's view, the United Nations—as an international forum that expresses the will and interests of the international community—is called upon not only to reaffirm the goals and principles of the final document of 1978, but primarily to take firm action in order to adopt a comprehensive program for nuclear and general disarmament. This program should include all the actions and measures that will be carried out in all fields of disarmament by international bodies and by member states. The program should be finalized on the basis of the project set forward by the Geneva Disarmament Conference and in keeping with the proposals that will be presented to the current session. The final document that will be adopted must be the result of the responsibility of all countries to resolutely engage on the path of disarmament and should include the close intercorrelation

between bilateral, regional, and universal negotiations. Thus, the measures that will be adopted during those negotiations should complete and support each other.

In keeping with its international policy of peace and cooperation among nations, and driven by the desire to contribute to the success of the proceedings of the current UN General Assembly special session on disarmament, Romania and its president present the following considerations to this high international forum:

1. In view of the serious danger posed by the existence of nuclear weapons to the present and future of mankind, this special session should arrive at an agreement on actions to be taken in order to speed up the negotiations on nuclear disarmament and complete elimination of such weapons from the states' arsenals.

Assessing the conclusion of the Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate- and Shorter-Range Missiles between the USSR and the USA as just a modest beginning, whose importance would materialize only to the extent to which it would be followed by new agreements, the General Assembly should call upon the Soviet Union and the United States to conclude the treaty on the 50 percent reduction in strategic weapons at the earliest possible time this year.

In order to achieve nuclear disarmament—the fundamental objective of mankind—Romania proposes the following:

—Besides the nuclear powers all interested states should take part in disarmament negotiations.

—A general program of nuclear disarmament should be worked out as soon as possible that should provide, as a primary and long-term goal, for the reduction of nuclear weapons until their total liquidation by the year 2000. This goal should be achieved in stages, according to a clear timetable.

—A special body for nuclear disarmament and the complete elimination of the nuclear weapons should be set up. Such a body would be the venue for negotiations on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, the halting of the testing of such weapons, and the working out of a general program of nuclear disarmament.

—In view of the danger of the ever-wider proliferation of nuclear weapons all over the world, the states possessing such weapons should withdraw the nuclear weapons to within their own national frontiers.

—The drafting of a program to curb improvements in the field of nuclear weapons and to halting the production of fissionable materials and delivery vehicles. All nuclear disarmament agreements should contain provisions that would ban the development of new military technologies in the respective fields. In order that nations all over the world may play a more important part and have a larger contribution to the achievement of nuclear disarmament, the United Nations should become a forum to monitor and control military technologies, to put an end to the development of new weapons of mass destruction.

—New negotiations should be started, with the participation of all states, on the elimination of short-range tactical nuclear weapons.

—As a part of the measures to reduce nuclear armament, it is very important that international cooperation projects should be set up to use fissionable materials for exclusively peaceful purposes.

—In order to speed up the nuclear disarmament process, the United Nations should extend its support to the endeavor of states that initiated the establishment of nuclear-free zones in various parts of the world and the proclamation of countries or cities free of nuclear weapons. It should also see to it that states with nuclear weapons guarantee the status of such regions, as nuclear-free zones.

The United Nations should call on the Balkan states, as well as on those in northern and central Europe and in other parts of the world to start negotiations with a view to turning those regions into zones of peace, cooperation and good-neighbourliness, free of nuclear weapons.

2. In view of the danger posed by the expansion of the arms race into the space, steps should be taken to renounce the militarization of space and to ensure it is used exclusively for peaceful purposes, for the benefit of mankind.

Romania proposes to this end:

—The conclusion of an international treaty on the use of space for peaceful purposes only, which would provide for the renunciation of the use of space for military purposes.

—The legal regulation also of the launching of satellites and other objects into space.

3. With a view to ensuring conditions of security and stability for all states, to reducing the danger of war, and to achieving disarmament in close relationship with the practical actions and measures conducive to the reduction and the liquidation of nuclear weapons, all chemical weapons should be eliminated.

In Romania's view this should result in the following:

—The formulation and implementation of a program of measures banning the use of chemical weapons and stipulating the liquidation of existing stocks. The cessation of the production of all kinds of chemical weapons should be concomitantly stipulated.

—The pledge of states that until all chemical weapons have been destroyed, they will not, under any circumstances, resort to such weapons.

—The encouragement by the United Nations of the setting up of chemical-weapon-free zones in the Balkans, in central Europe, and in other regions of the world. This is as an action to support the continuing negotiation of the convention on the complete prohibition of chemical weapons and on their elimination from the states' arsenals.

4. With a view to safeguarding international peace and security and strengthening confidence and detente among states, of utmost importance would be finding measures to sizably reduce the number of troops, conventional armaments, and military expenditures.

Taking the view that the reduction of military expenditures is an important step towards effective disarmament, Romania decided, as the result of a national referendum in November 1986, to unilaterally cut, by 5 percent, its troops, armaments, and military expenditures. In line with its policy of disarmament, the SR of Romania proposes the following:

—The annual reduction by all countries of their military expenditures, so that by the year 2000 the expenditures would drop by at least 50 percent against the present level.

—This session should adopt principles which are to govern the negotiation and conclusion of agreements on the reduction of military expenditures, as agreed upon by the UN commission on disarmament. This would create conditions to encourage concrete negotiations on the matter.

—Each disarmament agreement should also provide for an appropriate reduction in military expenditures.

In view of the fact that Europe is faced with the largest concentration of troops and conventional weapons and considering the background set by the conclusion of the Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate- and Shorter-Range Missiles, Romania proposes that measures be started for reducing conventional weapons as well. This should be accompanied by action to stop any modernization of short-range nuclear weapons.

—Likewise, the states participating in the two military alliances—NATO and the Warsaw Pact—should start negotiations on these issues, to be attended by all other European states, by the end of 1988. These negotiations should lead to sizable reductions of troops and conventional weapons, at least by 20 percent by 1990, by 30 to 35 percent by 1995, and by 50 percent by the year 2000. The reductions should apply first of all to major types of weapons, such as tanks, armoured cars, military aircrafts, missiles and warships.

—As soon as negotiations have begun, a moratorium should be called, whereby the troops, armaments and military expenditures of each country in the two alliances would be maintained at the 1988 level.

—The meeting on conventional disarmament should aim at setting the military balance at the lowest possible level of armed forces, armaments, and military expenditures.

—A study should be made and specific proposals worked out on the number of troops and armaments needed, as a necessary minimum for the defense of every country.

—As an important part of the conventional disarmament measures, the foreign military bases in the territory of other states should be dismantled and the foreign troops should be withdrawn to within the national borders.

—The states participating in the Warsaw Pact and NATO should start concrete negotiations for simultaneous dismantlement of the two military blocs, beginning with the dissolution of their military organizations.

5. Under the existing international conditions, and in order to make possible the implementation of measures conducive to eliminating the threat or use of force, Romania believes it is necessary:

—To work out rules, consistent with existing international conventions, to govern the movement and conduct of navies on the high seas. These rules would include prior notification to the United Nations of navy drills, and limitations on ship movements and concentrations in specified areas.

—To establish within the United Nations a committee for the peaceful use of seas and oceans.

6. In order to eliminate sources of suspicion and tension, and reduce the danger of military confrontation, it is of utmost importance to adopt new confidence- and security-building measures in Europe.

In this regard Romania proposes the following:

—Prohibiting aircraft, ships, and submarines carrying nuclear weapons from flying or passing in the vicinity of international borders.

—An international treaty should be concluded, forbidding any attack against civilian nuclear installations, both during armed conflicts and at time of peace; and for averting any terrorist act against such installations.

—The adoption of new confidence- and security-building measures such as: Limitation of armed forces taking part in military activities, and establishment of ceilings on the number of war vessels and aircraft participating in such activities; renunciation of military maneuvers close to the frontiers of other states; the establishment, along the borders between NATO and Warsaw Treaty countries, of a corridor free of nuclear, chemical and other weapons of mass-destruction, and free of offensive arms in general—from which ultimately all troops and armaments should be eliminated, except for the forces of order and border guards; and prohibition of the stationing of new troops and the setting up of new military bases in the territory of other states.

—Disarmament requires that the military doctrines of states should be re-examined and that the doctrines based on resort to war, especially to nuclear weapons, and to offensive armed forces, should be replaced by exclusively defensive ones.

7. The implementation of the package of measures aimed at curbing the arms race and at disarmament requires a strict and effective control with respect to the commitments assumed by states, so as to encourage and sustain the steps conducive to disarmament.

In this respect Romania proposes the following:

—The United Nations should contribute to working out verification and control procedures which would stimulate disarmament negotiations.

—An international body should be established within the United Nations, open to the participation of all states, which would ensure unbiased monitoring and control of the implementation in good faith of disarmament measures agreed upon through bilateral, regional, and universal agreements.

8. In view of the direct relationship existing between disarmament and the eradication of underdevelopment, the Socialist Republic of Romania submits the following proposals:

—An international development fund should be established, under United Nations auspices, to be financed from the resources made available as a result of disarmament measures, for assisting economic and social development, especially in the developing countries, as recommended by the 1987 international conference on the relationship between disarmament and development.

—The General Assembly should recommend that all disarmament agreements to be concluded from now on should stipulate that the resources made available through disarmament shall be used exclusively for peaceful purposes.

9. Current conditions in the world also require the democratization of international life and relations, and the active participation of all states in the settlement of the grave and complex problems facing mankind. The United Nations can play an important role in this respect, which makes it necessary that the states take new actions, such as:

—The establishment of a United Nations special body for settlement through negotiation, good offices, mediation, or conciliation, of interstate conflicts that are both a cause and a result of the arms race.

—The states conducting disarmament negotiations at a bilateral or regional level should systematically keep the other United Nations member states informed on the progress and results of their negotiations, through the agency of the secretary general or through other channels.

—The role played by the secretary general, either directly or through his special representatives, should be enhanced. He should act continuously to overcome difficulties that may arise during negotiations.

—The United Nations should launch a call to all states for "disarmament through facts," whereby they would be invited to initiate unilateral actions based on mutual example, such as freezing and reducing the number of armaments and troops, and the level of military expenditures. Such initiatives taken by states in response to the call of the United Nations should be registered at the UN headquarters and communicated to the other states.

10. Given the deterioration of international conditions as a result of the intensified arms race—particularly in the nuclear field—that threatens the peace and security of the whole of mankind and the very existence of life on our planet, the peoples and world public opinion are

called upon to be ever more active in opposing the dangerous trend of events and imposing resolute action in the field of disarmament.

A great responsibility in this respect devolves upon scientists. They have the calling and the moral duty to act for a halt to the arms race, and for the elimination of nuclear weapons, so that the great scientific and technological achievements of the human mind may be used in the interest of life and the advancement of mankind.

The Romanian delegation presents to the third special session of the UN General Assembly the concepts and proposals of Nicolae Ceausescu, president of the SR of Romania, for halting the arms race, primarily the nuclear arms race, and for proceeding to general disarmament. The delegation also reaffirms Romania's determination to contribute, together with the other member countries, to the implementation of this historical action, that is, to free mankind from the nightmare of a world catastrophe.

Working with a high spirit of responsibility, the international community and the United Nations have the power to bring about—through the decisions the current session will adopt—the halting of the dangerous course of events toward confrontation; the passage to effective military detente and disarmament measures; and the elimination of force and the threat of force from international relations. Nicolae Ceausescu, president of the SR of Romania, recently declared: "We should have confidence in the future of mankind, which depends on the elimination of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction, in order to ensure independent development, peace, and progress for all the nations of the world."

This humanist message represents an ardent call to all the countries of the world and to all nations to join in the effort to establish a better and more just world, free of weapons and of wars—a world in which each nation can concentrate its creative efforts on free and independent development on the road of socioeconomic progress.

YUGOSLAVIA

'Cumulative Value' of Moscow Summit 'Great'

AU0406183588 Belgrade Domestic Service in
Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 4 Jun 88

["Military commentary" by Dr Todor Mirkovic]

[Text] The meeting between President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev in Moscow, announced a long time ago and thoroughly prepared for, concluded with results that realistically reflect the times and the state of relations between the two superpowers. No new breakthroughs were achieved in agreement on a further reduction of nuclear weapons, but several other agreements and accords were reached, and their cumulative value is very great.

First, the exchange of ratified agreements on the destruction of intermediate- and shorter-range missiles made it quite certain that, unless something radically changes, 2,611 deployed and undeployed missile systems will be destroyed, with a total of 3,750 nuclear warheads. Following negotiations between the two superpowers that continued for years, this will be the first actual and effective reduction of armaments, and it will happen in the nuclear sphere.

Second, an agreement was signed on mutual exchange of information on strategic missile tests, which reduces the danger of an accidental outbreak of war.

Third, an agreement was reached on expanding control over the implementation of the 1974 treaty restricting underground nuclear tests.

Fourth, the level that had been reached by the two sides in agreeing on the text of the agreement reducing strategic nuclear forces by 50 percent of the present state was confirmed, and the negotiating teams in Geneva were given instructions to continue the negotiations and to find possible solutions so that the agreement could perhaps be signed before the end of this year.

Fifth, the state of some important treaties signed earlier on arms control and disarmament was examined, especially the 1972 treaty restricting the construction of antimissile systems, and their validity was confirmed.

Last, but not least, the two sides at this summit again examined the so-called regional problems and indicated their readiness to find ways, through joint efforts, to extinguish active hotbeds of conflict and to prevent the serious ones from flaring up.

Considered from a military strategic and military political angle, the significance of the meeting and the talks in Moscow may be summarized as follows:

First, the modern world has pulled further back from the brink of a general nuclear war. This has been achieved more through the elimination of mistrust that accumulated over a long time than through the reduction in the level of nuclear armaments.

Second, the behavior of the superpowers in their mutual relations and in relations with other countries has significantly changed. This implies their contribution to ending local and regional conflicts, and this contribution is possible and may be significant, because the two superpowers are directly or indirectly present and influential in almost every existing conflict.

'Unrealistic To Expect Progress' at Summit
AU0706181788 Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian
4-5 Jun 88 p 13

[Vlado Teslic commentary in "The Week in the World" column: "The Pale Summit"]

[Text] When after a third successive summit of their leaders and after a euphoric heralding of an era of nuclear disarmament, the two superpowers only 4 months later, at their fourth summit, do not achieve anything new or anything else but a "useful" and "realistic" dialogue, observers are left with little space for meditations in the spirit of that old statement, that even this much is some success. It is much more realistic, in fact, to bow to the opinion that the era of nuclear disarmament will be very protracted, uncertain, and painful.

According to the most frequent assessment, this was a pale summit conducted in a good atmosphere in the glittering decorum of the Kremlin, which did not achieve what was possible and what was necessary so that world peace and security may be put on firmer foundations.

This probably influenced a number of prominent statesmen to resolutely reject in the United Nations, at the extraordinary session devoted to disarmament, the doctrine of nuclear deterrent (Zimbabwe President Mugabe) and to point out that international security cannot be reduced merely to relations between the two superpowers, as powerful as they may be (Swedish Premier Carlsson).

It is a pity that the superpowers' leaders did not appear at the UN rostrum. It is a pity not only because it would have been an act of encouragement and a contribution to the whole problem of disarmament, but also because of the inevitable political "counterinfluence" by the democratic majority on the superpowers. It could not happen in that case that the joint communique of the two leaders failed to accept peaceful coexistence or the universality of human rights on UN principles.

(Dis)agreement About Arms

It is difficult not to remark that the big powers are still far from such a policy and rules of behavior. They have gone along a different road, realistic in its way, and certainly they are led by their special interests. Among other things, this has led them to dialogue and agreement on points where it was possible, as the agreement on the elimination of a superfluous missile system has shown. Everything else—and as much as 95 percent of nuclear arms were left untouched—remains extremely uncertain.

The Moscow summit certainly demonstrated to some extent that cold war and confrontation policy is being abandoned. There have been few signs, however, that the

superpowers are moving toward abandoning the bloc policy or that they have reached agreement that they should inevitably renounce the doctrine of nuclear deterrent.

It is only in this light that it is possible to comprehend what has been achieved, and even better what has not been achieved, both in the sphere of further disarmament and in the political field.

It was shown once again that the syndrome of the nuclear deterrent or dissuader is too strong to allow an agreement eliminating at least one half of strategic nuclear arms to be signed at present. Of course one should not doubt Reagan's wish to reduce these arms. But he himself erected a barrier in the shape of the plan to construct an antinuclear shield in space for the protection of the United States.

Of course, Reagan also has to consider the demands of his allies who want to retain the American nuclear umbrella. The nuclear lobby in America is not strong enough to prevent Reagan from signing yet another agreement, but there is no doubt that for new agreements the public and Congress would like almost unrealistic concessions from the other side, whether these concessions are made in the verification or the classical [klasikal] disarmament fields. After all, Reagan was sufficiently careful to invite to Moscow the congressmen who publicly expressed their doubt in a possibility of reaching an agreement on strategic missiles quickly, which ensured to the president a retreat from the summit's most important battlefield.

This is America's old complex, because Nixon and Kissinger also abandoned a similar agreement on nuclear disarmament. President Eisenhower was closest to an agreement back in the fifties when he negotiated with Khrushchev, but seemed to have lost a real chance either because he did not have enough strength or was not ready.

Disputed Policy

In this situation, Gorbachev did not have much of a choice but to insist on a new summit and a new agreement before the end of Reagan's term of office, although he must have been aware of the fact that this was not realistic. He also insisted on American concessions in its strategy of intensive armament in both space and at sea.

This is probably the end of the nuclear disarmament chapter during Reagan's term of office, which was expected. The Moscow summit is therefore characterized by a dialogue on some political issues imposed by Reagan as a self-proclaimed messiah of human rights and freedom.

It is difficult to say that Reagan was more successful in this than his hosts, who enabled him to stage a real political show in Moscow that would be unusual even for

America. Addressing intellectuals, dissidents, and the Russian people, the skillful "communicator" cited the great names in Soviet literature and art. However, in the atmosphere of glasnost and in the midst of restructuring [Russian word perestroyka used], all this appeared as some kind of mission from the last centuries rather than a vision of the future. This was even below the standard of Nixon's "kitchen debate" held in Moscow in 1959.

Of course, in this context it was unrealistic to expect progress in resolving regional crises, particularly the crisis in the Middle East where disrespect for human and other rights of Palestinians continues to be the bone of contention and the goodwill test for the Americans.

Perhaps we have understated the concluded agreements and readiness for new agreements that will also bind the new President. It appears however that much more is needed, especially in the United States, above all readiness to change its policy and not only toward the USSR.

In Moscow, the least was said about this new world. This is, in fact, where the greatest importance of the United Nations extraordinary session lies, a session that reminded us about the real essence of and need for disarmament, the real essence of peace and security, and the interdependence of the world toward which the United States and the USSR as superpowers have special obligations.

Journalists Briefed on Cruise Missile Removal From UK

*LD0806205088 Moscow TASS in English
2049 GMT 9 Jun 88*

[Text] Greenham Common June 8 TASS—TASS correspondent Igor Peskov reports:

Spokesmen for the command of the U.S. troops in Britain gave a news conference for local and foreign journalists here today at the Air Force base where U.S. surface-to-surface cruise missiles are deployed. The pressmen were informed of the forthcoming removal of the cruise missiles from Britain and of a procedure to verify it.

It was announced at the news conference that Soviet experts would be able to inspect for 60 days from the beginning of July this year the missile systems subject to elimination, the places of their storing and repair at Greenham Common and Molesworth.

Colonel Bill Jones, commander of the 501st Tactical Missile Wing of the U.S. Air Force, said his unit has at its disposal 101 cruise missiles at Greenham Common and 18 ones at Molesworth. They all will be taken away to the United States where they are subject to elimination. Jones pointed out that neither missiles nor warheads were removed from the U.S. bases so far. Specific timeframe for their dismantling would be determined at the forthcoming consultations within the framework of NATO. The last American missile would be removed from Britain exactly by the time specified by the Soviet-U.S. treaty. Until that time the remaining missiles would remain operational.

At the close of the news conference the journalists were given an opportunity to tour the areas of the base subject to inspection by Soviet experts, the cruise missiles, and launchers.

We are already prepared for the arrival of Soviet experts and we are going to welcome them hospitably and to show them everything that is provided for by the agreement, Bill Jones said in an interview with the TASS correspondent. I personally regard the INF Treaty as a big success. We have finally approached a time when mutual reduction in nuclear arsenals has become possible, and there appeared prospects for further steps in the field of disarmament.

Missiles To Be Destroyed in 'a Few Days'

*LD1006121088 Moscow TASS in English
1152 GMT 10 Jun 88*

[Text] Moscow June 10 TASS—By TASS diplomatic correspondent:

A few days remain before the first batches of nuclear intermediate- and shorter-range missiles will be destroyed. The Soviet-U.S. treaty on their elimination took effect on the day of exchange of the instruments of ratification at the Moscow summit meeting, signifying the beginning of the age of nuclear disarmament.

Following the course of glasnost and openness on disarmament issues, the Soviet Union invited the UN secretary-general, representatives of member states of the Security Council, Zimbabwe, whose president is the current chairman of the Non-Aligned Movement, and delegates of the conference on disarmament to attend one of the first procedures to destroy missiles.

The Soviet Union started implementing obligations stemming from the treaty in advance, before the treaty took effect. The withdrawal of Soviet shorter-range missiles OTR-22 and OTR-23 (SS-12 and SS-23) from the German Democratic Republic and Czechoslovakia started in February. They are delivered to a missile site at Saryozek in the Kazakh desert for destruction. The first batch of Soviet missiles was blown up there on a trial basis.

Late last week, scores of foreign journalists from the United States, Britain, the Federal Republic of Germany, France, Belgium and other countries visited the Soviet military base at Sarniy, the western Ukraine. They familiarized themselves with all stages of dismantling and eliminating launchers and transporters for intermediate-range missiles RSD-10, known in the West as SS-20. The missiles of this class will be destroyed at the Kapustin Yar base in the Volgograd region.

As for the warheads of the intermediate- and shorter-range missiles, their frames will be destroyed together with boosters, while the charge will be removed and converted for use in the economy.

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

Government Spokesman Views Further Disarmament

DW301149 Bremen Radio Bremen Network in German
1530 GMT 28 May 88

[Interview with government spokesman Friedhelm Ost by correspondent Schnell on the "Bonn and the Federal Laender" program in Bonn; date not given]

[Text]

Schnell: What does the FRG Government expect the Moscow summit to produce?

Ost: The Federal Government expects that the meeting in Moscow will show further steps toward improving East-West relations as a whole. That means, first of all, definite further steps regarding disarmament and arms control. Following the historic signing of the INF Treaty at the last summit in Washington, we now think that other steps should be made. We want the strategic systems to be reduced by 50 percent. Even if no definite treaty will be concluded in Moscow now—on account of the difficult verification problems—we think negotiations should continue on strategic weapons. Maybe success can be reached during President Reagan's term, which ends early next year. However, there are also other sectors that we regard to be important. It is important that the two politicians have talks on the highest level and that they pave the way. One important goal is that the Soviet Union—the Warsaw—Pact, will give up its invasion capability.

Schnell: The FRG chancellor will go to Moscow in the fall. Can we expect that the summit and the increasingly relaxed relationship between the highest U.S. and Soviet leaders will have positive effects on FRG-Soviet relations?

Ost: I believe it is very important that, beside the important disarmament and arms control matters, progress be achieved in other sectors like East-West relations. The overall atmosphere should improve, and we would benefit from it, of course. The FRG chancellor's trip to Moscow and the visit by General Secretary Gorbachev to Bonn—both things must be seen in one context—are very important stages for FRG-Soviet relations. The FRG chancellor has repeatedly stressed that he is prepared to open a new chapter in FRG-Soviet relations. We will seek to have better relations in the political field, and of course beyond the political field. Issues of human rights play a great part. We see that the Soviet Union is very accommodating when it comes, for example, to Russians of German ethnic origin leaving the country. In 1986, about 750 of such Russians were able to come to our country. Last year it was several thousands of them. In the first quarter of this year alone

some 10,000 Russians of German origin have come from the USSR to the FRG. They were permitted to leave their country, and we hope that trend will continue.

Schnell: Former Soviet ambassador to Bonn, Falin, spoke of new dynamics in German-Soviet relations. What did he mean by that? Political relations or mainly economic ones?

Ost: I think that both fields, policy and economy, are very closely linked. In both fields there can be new impulses and new dynamics, as Falin said. The Soviet Union is particularly interested in better economic relations in the fields of technology, science, and medicine. Many fields of interest coincide here. The Federal chancellor pointed out a year ago in his government statement the Soviet Union's great significance for us and naturally also for our relations with the other Warsaw Pact states. A better German-Soviet climate would have a positive effect on intra-German relations.

Schnell: Closer economic relations with the Soviet Union and with East Bloc states as a whole depend mostly on credit problems. The Soviet Union will obtain loans, loans that have been criticized by the Americans and by individual persons in Bonn. Do you think that giving loans to the Soviet Union is absolutely unobjectionable?

Ost: Well, you have seen that granting loans is a matter of private banks and finance institutes. There is a global loan, for example, that Deutsche Bank wants to grant the Soviet Union for certain projects. The Soviet Union has placed a loan in Switzerland lately, and one will be placed in the FRG by a syndicate headed by a big German bank. The Soviet Union is trustworthy on international finance markets. These are not state credits though. However, I believe that close economic relations can support political relations.

In this connection we must naturally not forget the horrible cruelties committed in Nazi times. This cannot be simply ignored. However, I think that it is now a matter of continuing the good traditional German-Russian relations and of developing them in a good and cooperative way.

Kohl, Ost, Dregger Comment on Moscow Summit
LD0106140888 Hamburg DPA in German
1323 GMT 1 Jun 88

Bonn (DPA)—Federal Chancellor Helmut Kohl has welcomed the summit between U.S. President Ronald Reagan and Kremlin leader Mikhail Gorbachev as being "on the whole successful."

Government spokesman Friedhelm Ost stated today in a first reaction that the chancellor was, above all, grateful to Reagan for putting forward German concerns and Berlin's interests. He stressed that Reagan had made human rights a particular theme of the summit. Ost

announced that the number of resettlers from the Soviet Union rose to 2,900 in April, and was thus six times higher than in the whole of last year.

The government spokesman repeated the formula that the Federal Government placed central significance on German-Soviet relations, and wanted to give them a particular quality. The summit would also have a positive effect on the preparations for the meeting between Kohl and Gorbachev. He recalled that Kohl will travel to Moscow in the fall, and that Gorbachev plans on visiting the Federal Republic at the beginning of next year.

Ost linked the expectation of further disarmament steps to the results of the Moscow summit. In this context he named an agreement on strategic nuclear missiles, a global ban on chemical weapons, the creation of conventional stability in Europe, and the reduction of short-range nuclear systems with a range of under 500 km.

Alfred Dregger, head of the CDU/CSU Bundestag group, expressed similar sentiments. Beyond this he stressed that it was importance for Germans and Europeans that Soviet superiority in nuclear short-range missiles be reduced, as they were particularly threatened by this. While Dregger put forward the opinion that spectacular results could not have been expected from the summit, Michaela Geiger, foreign policy spokeswoman for the Union Bundestag group, said that the meeting had to be assessed as an "outstanding event." She pointed to Reagan's statements on human rights, and said that in contrast to earlier meetings, this time "nettles too had been grasped."

Chancellor Kohl Interviewed on Moscow Summit
*DW031051 Hamburg ARD Television Network in
German 1950 GMT 1 Jun 88*

[Interview with Chancellor Helmut Kohl on the "Brennpunkt" program; name of interviewer, place not given—recorded]

[Txt] [Kohl] The result of the Moscow summit is fantastic for all of us. There are many details, however, where one could say that this or that could be better. But if you look back at the 1983-1988 period, who would have considered this possible?

Reporter: Including you?

Kohl: No. I was certain—and I always said so—that a good chance for understanding would come at the end of the Reagan era.

Second, I was always certain—for a long time I was the only one to say so—that we need personal meetings between such personalities as Gorbachev and Ronald Reagan. That does not eliminate the problems, but now we have an INF Treaty, a good chance to cut intercontinental missiles by 50 percent along with START this

year. In the FRG this fall, we will experience the withdrawal of the first Pershings, a withdrawal we decided upon in October 1983. I think we have a chance to achieve some progress in chemical weapons, despite great verification problems.

I am certain that it will be very tough, but there will be some motion in the field of conventional armament and missiles with a range below 500 km. For us Germans all of this is a most important matter.

Something else is also equally important. At the first meeting between Reagan and Gorbachev in Geneva, they issued a communique to which not enough attention has been given. They said: We want improvement at all levels. That is too little, regardless of how threatening weapons are. If after decades of cold war and hard worldwide debate, international relations deal only with disarmament—regardless of how important disarmament is—we need improvements in cultural relations and in economic relations. Most important is the human rights issue.

I think we should thank the U.S. President for touching on the human rights issue in his Moscow university speech. Human rights involves religious freedom, the exit of Jews from the Soviet Union, the exit of ethnic Germans living there who want to return to their old homeland—to us. Important things have happened in that field lately.

Reporter: We were courageous enough to give this program the subtitle: Will a New Age begin? You were speaking and thinking in historical dimensions. Do you think the age of cold war will come to an end during this phase?

Kohl: I would warn against writing headlines about the beginning of a new phase. I think it is better if those following us write the headlines, because it will then be more serious and reflect history. However, I will go on with your thought in another form. General Secretary Gorbachev wrote to me in a letter some months ago—when we were setting schedules for my visit to Moscow in the fall and his to the FRG in the spring next year—about opening a new page in the history book on relations between Germans and Russians of the Soviet Union.

There is a real chance now, but the situation also contains dangers if it is assessed incorrectly. We can get international relations going only if we are loyal to our principles, if we are persistent, and patient, and—I will say it again—if we grab the chance when it comes up. I think that at the moment there are chances we only dreamed about a few years ago. Whether we will take advantage of them on both sides, I cannot say yet. I can only say that I will make my contribution to it.

Reporter: When you think of dangers, do you consider the fact that the U.S. secretary of state and the Soviet foreign minister have met 25 times in the past years; that there were 4 summit meetings; and meetings between the foreign ministers and their delegations who talked a great deal about our fate without our participation? Does that bother you?

Kohl: No, I do not see it as a danger, and I do not have that feeling either. The Americans consult us before and after every one of those meetings. Usually we receive good information just a few hours later. Last year the Soviet Union also began informing us after the talks and agreements. An hour ago the President sent me—today—a report on events of the day and a message of gratitude.

Reporter: Did he tell you anything that we did not know?

Kohl: No. I do not want to discuss such things now. However, he said one thing that is quite important and which shows that we have a considerable share in the development. He pointed out that without my decision on the Pershing-1A, the decision on the Pershing -2A would have been impossible. That was about 1 year ago, in August last year. As you know, many people criticized that decision. Of course, it was the right decision. I do not think that world powers all by themselves, in isolation, can have talks beyond continents. Europe is a reality.

Reporter: But Europe has no spokesman.

Kohl: That is true.

Reporter: To be sure, somebody should be there who might speak on behalf of Europe with the two big powers.

Kohl: For example, when you regard the talks within NATO, when for instance my British colleague, or the French president, or myself—when we three put in our word—then that is quite decisive, including for the Americans. There has always been a great degree of harmony and a real triad between us. I have no feelings of inferiority at all.

Reporter: When do you think Europe will be ready to have a spokesman?

Kohl: First, we must continue with our European activities. That is not a matter of Moscow or Washington. During the last 20 years we failed to speed up the matter. Nevertheless, we have made much progress during the last 2 or 3 years. Tomorrow I will again meet the French president. We will make preparations for the forthcoming Hannover EC summit. We have the breakthrough. We will achieve a big European market in 1992. That will be a market without boundaries for some 330 million people. It also means a giant step forward for security policy.

Reporter: During the days before the summit you paid a private visit to the GDR. Should there be any changes following the Moscow meeting? What might be the implications for the two German states?

Kohl: I believe many things have changed. That is demonstrated by what the U.S. President said in Moscow—that the wall must be removed, that there were real changes in policy between East Berlin and Bonn, and that last year more than 3 1/2 million compatriots from the GDR came to visit our country. This year the number of visitors may go up in such a way that some 4 million visitors may come.

I am full of hope that such a process will stretch over several years. Considering the total number of GDR inhabitants—16 million people—it is quite possible that some three quarters of the GDR citizens may one day have been in our country, to pay visits to their friends and relatives. The exception is those who are not permitted to leave their country for professional reasons. Those having been here will have gained an image of their own. My recent 3-day trip to the GDR was all private. I did not meet any official. That was my desire. The trip to the GDR was one of the most important trips that I have made in years because I was able to gain a very personal impression.

Foreign Minister Appeals to U.S., USSR
LD0606082288 Hamburg DPA in German
0715 GMT 6 Jun

[Text] New York (DPA)—Federal Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher today appealed to the United States and the Soviet Union to continue along the path which has been started by agreeing before year's end on a 50-percent reduction of their strategic potentials. In a keynote speech to the UN special General Assembly, Genscher also called on the community of states to clear away the last obstacles on the path toward the worldwide elimination of chemical weapons. He also emphatically supported a new worldwide security system, for which he unfolded a comprehensive catalogue of preconditions.

"The Moscow summit has given mankind new hope," Genscher said. "I call for an alliance of reason, in order to strengthen this new development and to implement it against the pusillanimous and the malicious, the myopic and those who are still prisoners of their images of the enemy."

In Europe, it is right to "utilize the new developments in the Soviet Union for the creation of a European order of peace, and for the construction of a joint European house." The Federal Government will be expanding and developing relations with the Soviet Union, "which are of central importance for the attainment of this great aim." "History shows how important is the relationship between the Germans and the peoples of the Soviet Union for the situation in Europe."

The year 1988 must be "the year of the start of negotiations on conventional stability. The conventional superiority of the East is the fundamental problem of security in Europe." For Europe, we want a system of cooperative security, which rules out the start and waging of a conventional war," the minister said. "The target is a situation in Europe whereby no side any longer has the capability of attack on foreign territory." This already applies to the forces of the Western alliance.

In agreement principally with the proposals of the non-aligned states, Genscher also supported the utilization of the United Nations with its facilities for settling conflicts: "Peace policy must increasingly be a universal matter. This universal responsibility for peace should give us cause to think how we may strengthen and expand the apparatus of the United Nations for securing peace and overcoming conflicts."

Defense Minister Scholz Views Moscow Summit
AU0606162788 Bonn DIE WELT in German
6 Jun 88 p 4

[Interview With Defense Minister Rupert Scholz by Enno von Loewenstern: "Encouraging: Moscow's Support for Asymmetric Disarmament"; date and place not given]

[Text] Loewenstern: Has the summit introduced a new stage of the disarmament and detente policy?

Scholz: The Moscow summit is of great importance, indeed. Despite limited detailed results, it permits a certain amount of justified optimism with regard to further development. Above all, both sides have expressed support for the principle of dialogue and readiness for detente—regardless of continuing and often clashing differences in systems and blocs. It is, however, important for the policy of detente that dialogue is being further developed on the basis of mutual trust and compatible interests.

Loewenstern: What will happen now; what are the main goals for the disarmament debate now?

Scholz: First of all, we have to stress the positive fact that the INF agreement was signed in Moscow. Then there is the positive fact of the mutual willingness to make the fastest possible progress in the START negotiations on the 50-percent reduction of intercontinental weapons. On the other hand, particularly in the latter complex of issues there are still essential questions—especially for us Europeans—that have not been cleared as yet. I refer, above all, to the mobile intercontinental missiles, the deployment of air-and sea-based cruise missiles and, on the Soviet side, to the modern, mobile SS 24 and SS 25 missile systems, which—with regard to their targets—can even replace the SS 20's that are now to be destroyed because of the INF Treaty. In particular, the latter weapons systems require a European security and disarmament concept that guarantees overall balance.

By far the most urgent task for the future is, however, conventional disarmament. Because in the conventional field the Warsaw Pact still has a massive superiority—this is the field where Soviet armament has been continued without any change under Gorbachev. In particular in the area of heavy equipment, tanks and artillery, the Warsaw Pact still has such a great superiority that one still must speak of its evident capability for invasion. Where NATO definitely limits its conventional armament to defense, the Warsaw Pact has an unchanged offensive potential both in its armament and in its military doctrine. I see, however, an encouraging start in the Soviet side's support for asymmetric disarmament because this not only includes the admission of its own superiorities ("disparities") but also support for the elimination of such superiorities. Hopefully the Moscow summit has promoted the mandate for the basic negotiations for conventional disarmament. Not only do we have to achieve full balance at the lowest possible level in the nuclear field but also in the conventional field. This means, first of all equal, upper limits, and—because of the aspect of the lowest possible level—these can be lower than the current NATO armament level. It is obvious that this will be very difficult in detail. On the other hand, the encouraging signals of the Moscow summit should be put into practice quickly. In particular on the question of disarmament, what is needed are not words but deeds.

Loewenstern: Are the Moscow negotiations and results an expression of a new bilateralism between the United States and the Soviet Union? Where do the Europeans stand?

Scholz: Even though it is a matter of course that the superpowers—United States and Soviet Union—coordinate their interests bilaterally, we cannot only speak of bilateralism. On the contrary, from the very start the negotiations that President Reagan held in Moscow had a firm and solidary link with the alliance as a whole and were coordinated with all NATO partners, with all Europeans. Europe still is the central venue of a conflict between East and West; Europe and, in particular, Germany are divided; Europe and, in particular, Germany suffer under this division; Europe and we Germans must therefore particularly act in our own interests in East-West relations. In this respect we Germans—because of the division of our country and the fate of our nation—play a pioneering role.

For the Western alliance it is important that the entire concept of detente and disarmament which is being worked out as a future-oriented long-term strategy, so to speak, keeps the security balance with the East; maintains transatlantic solidarity; realizes the overall political connection of detente, security, armament, and disarmament; balances the security options and necessities; and thus becomes the basis for a really strong and progressive relation of mutual security in the East-West relations.

Loewenstern: "Concept of mutual security"—does this mean "security partnership" as supported by the SPD or "cooperative security structure" as demanded by Foreign Minister Genscher?

Scholz: No. Security partnership is a formula that distorts the meaning both from the political and the strategic perspective. Because how should a partnership exist where, for instance, the one side, the Warsaw Pact, remains capable of invasion and the other side, the Western alliance, is only capable of defense because of the meaning of the alliance, the political structure, and its own armed forces? "Cooperative security structure" in Genscher's sense is meaningful in those specific instances when one has to find and develop cooperative disarmament processes and cooperative control mechanisms in the corresponding stage of verification with regard to individual armament systems.

With regard to the overall concept, what is important is mutual security that is based on detente, disarmament, balance in the armaments of both sides, and on a system of mutual confidence-building measures, which are appropriate in implementing the principle of dialogue—regardless of the existing differences between the systems—without lapsing into obtrusively distorting or deceiving formulas, such as that of a security partnership. The concept of mutual security also makes clear that disarmament is not a politically independent fact, that disarmament has a necessary connection with detente. Armament can create or increase tensions. Therefore, disarmament requires the previous political detente while maintaining the balance in defense policy. The connection of disarmament and detente must, therefore, not be inverted, as this is often done in the

political discussion in our country. Disarmament alone, carried out in isolation without consideration for progress in political detente, is dangerous and counterproductive from an overall political viewpoint.

Loewenstern: How much importance do you accord to human rights in the concept of effective mutual security?

Scholz: The very frank, even though controversial, discussion of human rights in Moscow is one of the most important results of the summit. In particular the clear words spoken by President Reagan at Moscow University and the Soviet Union's basic readiness to deal with the human rights issue in further discussions are of fundamental importance.

Mutual security requires mutual trust. Nothing can contribute more strongly to the establishment of trust than the readiness to respect man, his dignity, and his rights in one's own sphere of influence. Let us just remember that in Germany people who want to exercise their right to freedom of movement are still being shot at. Nothing gives more evidence of the need to respect human rights than the situation in our divided country. In the end, real detente—detente based on mutual trust—starts with the individual himself. Where people are shot at, the elementary preconditions for real detente are missing. Thus, detente really starts with the individual and his rights. Therefore, when working with the Moscow results after the summit, the topic of human rights has to be given priority. Respect for human rights reduces tensions. It can lead the peaceful competition of the systems, which the Eastern side likes to stress, to a real competition and will prove, above all, that all Europeans—across all borders—want peace, detente, and freedom.

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